Abstract. This paper analyzes empirically the distribution of unemployment durations in West Germany during the 1980s and 1990s. It therefore covers periods before and after the changes during the mid-1980s in the maximum entitlement periods for unemployment benefits for older unemployed. The analysis is based on the IAB employment subsample containing administrative data for about 500,000 individuals. Since these data only partly reveal the unemployment duration in an economic sense, we use a narrow and a wide proxy for unemployment. Our empirical analysis finds significant changes in the distribution of non-employment durations for older unemployed. At the same time, the distribution of unemployment durations between jobs remained unchanged after the reforms. Our findings clearly show that many firms and workers used the more beneficial laws as a part of early retirement packages. Surprisingly, for those workers who found and accepted a new job, we do not observe a prolongation of their search periods to a sizeable extent.
INTRODUCTION
Standard job search theory implies that longer entitlement periods for unemployment benefits increase the expected duration of unemployment spells until individuals accept a new job, because unemployment benefits act as a search subsidy (see Katz and Meyer, 1990; Meyer, 2002, for surveys) . Theory also suggests that the incidence of unemployment among those eligible for benefits should increase. Whether the quality of post-unemployment jobs ( job match) as measured by the level of earnings or the stability of employment should improve, depends on the specific assumptions regarding the model (Meyer, 2002) , for example regarding the endogeneity of search effort.
In a seminal paper for the US, Meyer (1990) uses institutional changes as a natural experiment to identify the empirical effect of unemployment insurance on unemployment duration. The study finds that an increase in the entitlement period results in a sizeable increase in unemployment durations. The main purpose of our paper is to re-examine these results using administrative data from Germany. As a contribution to the literature, our analysis takes into account that unemployment, in an economic sense, is not observed in administrative data. For this reason, we use two different proxies for unemployment, namely non-employment and unemployment between jobs. Our empirical results strongly depend upon the definition of unemployment.
A number of institutional changes in the West German unemployment compensation system were enacted between 1985 and 1987. The most important changes were the extensions of the maximum entitlement periods for unemployment benefits in the case of older unemployed, while entitlement lengths for the younger unemployed were not changed. The analysis here analyzes the effects on unemployment durations due to this natural experiment. Although these reforms were conducted during the 1980s, its analysis is still of high policy relevance, as it can provide insights about possible effects of a reduction in benefit entitlement periods which were implemented by policy-makers in Germany in the year 2006 and partly reversed in 2008. Taken together, these recent changes effectively undo a vast part of the extensions of the benefit entitlement periods in the 1980s. The recent reforms attempt to boost the labor market participation rate of those aged 55-64, which declined by 5 percentage points between 1980 and 1995, reaching its minimum (35%) between 1985 and 1991. Several moderate legal changes between 1997 and 2001 intended making early retirement more difficult but the low labor force participation rate for the 55-64 year olds has remained at a low level (38% in 2002; OECD, 2003b) .
Starting with Hunt (1995) , a number of studies have analyzed empirically unemployment durations in West Germany before and after the reforms in the 1980s (see, among others, Decressin, 2001; Hujer and Schneider, 1995; Plamann, 2002; Steiner, 1997; Weber, 1999) . Most of these studies are based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
1 Hunt (1995) finds that the extensions in benefit entitlements resulted in a strong increase of unemployment durations of the older workers. Section 2 discusses that this finding is not undisputed in the literature. The conflicting evidence based on the that a major part of the additional expenses by the German federal labor office yielded an advantage for mainly two groups: companies, who disband their older unemployed using subsidized early retirement packages, and the older employees, who lost the incentive to look for a new job using the extensive early retirement packages.
Since unemployment between jobs is an endogenous outcome conditioning on the exit state in a competing risk model, which involves exits from unemployment to both employment and to out of the labor force, more research on the determinants of these exits and on the determinants of inflows into unemployment is needed. Our descriptive evidence cannot provide causal evidence as to why the distribution of unemployment between jobs duration did not change.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the data and the institutions. Non-employment and unemployment between jobs are defined in Section 4 as two proxies for unemployment available in the data. Section 5 presents our main descriptive findings on the durations for the two proxies and the changes induced by the reforms. Section 6 provides complementary evidence on employment before and after unemployment. Section 7 summarizes and interprets the results and concludes. Appendix A contains further institutional information and the detailed empirical findings.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Our review of the literature focuses on the effects of benefit entitlement periods because their extension was the main aspect of the reforms during the 1980s in Germany. Meyer (2002) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2003a) provide recent surveys on the effects of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment. Empirical studies for the US find significantly positive elasticities of duration with respect to the potential duration of benefits. Meyer (1990) uses institutional changes as a natural experiment to identify the effect of changes in unemployment insurance on unemployment duration in a hazard rate model. These institutional changes are not affected by differences in unobserved heterogeneity, which might have plagued previous evidence. Meyer (1990) finds that an increase in the entitlement period by 1 week results in an increase of unemployment duration by 0.1-0.2 weeks, which is a sizeable disincentive effect of benefit entitlement. This estimate implies an elasticity around 0.5, and the earlier literature even found larger elasticities (as surveyed in Meyer, 2002) . In contrast, the more recent literature tends to find much smaller elasticities for the US (e.g. 0.1 as in Card and Levine, 2000) . Narendranathan et al. (1995) find for Britain a positive elasticity of expected unemployment duration for men with respect to the level of unemployment benefits. The effect depends on the age and is smaller for those greater than 45 years. They do not find an impact for the long-term unemployed. Van den Berg (1990) obtains positive elasticities using data from the Netherlands in a non-stationary job search model. The elasticities are greater after two years of duration time. Recently, van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) provide quasiexperimental evidence for Slovenia that a reduction in benefit entitlement periods strongly increased job finding rates, whereas the quality of the post-unemployment jobs remained unaffected: the paper finds that the change had no effect on either the type of the contract (temporary vs. permanent), the duration of the post-unemployment jobs, or the wage earned in this job.
For Germany, the study by Hunt (1995) is the first to analyze the strong institutional changes in benefit entitlement periods during the 1980s. During that time, benefit entitlement periods were extended from 12 months up to 32 months by age groups (42-43, 44-48, 49-53, 54 þ ) , where the extension was stronger for older workers (see Table A .1).
3 The transition was stepwise over the years 1985-87 for the different age groups. Since the maximum entitlement periods for unemployment spells starting in 1984 or later was also extended ex post, smoother transitions in the data would be expected, rather than a single jump. The unemployment durations started in 1983 were the last to which only the old law applied.
Using the GSOEP for the years 1983-88, Hunt models exit from unemployment with a competing risks Cox model combined with a differencein-differences approach. The treatment group is the age group of unemployed who are possibly affected by the institutional changes, irrespective of whether the individual unemployed is eligible for benefits. Control variables are an individual's age group, the time period, the interaction of time and age (treatment groups), and various demographic variables. The control group consisted of unemployed individuals aged 41 or less. Identification comes from the differential effect of the policy changes on the treatment and control groups. The analysis finds some significant positive effects of potential duration of benefits in Germany on the actual duration of unemployment. For the 44-48-year-old group, the reforms mainly reduced exits to employment, whereas for the older age group of 49-57, the benefit duration effect is much smaller and works only through an extension of the duration until exit to out of the labor force. Also for the 49-57 age group, the extension of the unemployment durations seems to have started before the reform took place. However, as mentioned in the introduction, aspects of the reforms were extended ex post to ongoing spells. The standard errors of the estimated effects of benefit durations are very high, which Hunt attributes to the small 2. Earlier studies for Germany, which had estimated the impact of benefit recipience on the duration of unemployment, could not distinguish well the benefit effect from unobserved heterogeneity; see Hunt (1995) . Benefit eligibility depends upon previous work experience, possibly resulting in a positive selection of benefit recipients. 3. For a detailed description of the German unemployment compensation system and of the conducted reforms, see Hunt (1995) and Plamann (2002) .
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size of the various treatment groups when stratified by exit state. The estimated treatment effects are never jointly significant and no significant effect is found for the age group 42-43. While Hunt (1995, p. 110) mentions the possibility that some of the older workers in the age range 49-57 may participate in early retirement schemes on the way out of the labor force, this issue is not investigated further in her study. Based on Hunt's estimated competing risk model for the age group 49-57, which implies that the extension of benefit entitlements works only through extending the time until exit out of the labor force, the institutional reforms should have caused an observed increase in the share of exits of this group to employment and an extension of observed duration of unemployment among those who eventually show a transition to employment. Anticipating our results, we show that these implications are not supported by our administrative data.
After the study by Hunt (1995) , a number of further studies have analyzed empirically unemployment durations in West Germany before and after the reforms under consideration (Decressin, 2001; Hujer and Schneider, 1995; Plamann, 2002; Steiner, 1997; Weber, 1999) . Most of these studies are based on the GSOEP and some studies confirm the negative disincentive effect on unemployment duration.
4 Hujer and Schneider (1995) find that the age group of 44-48 exhibits significantly smaller re-employment hazards compared with younger workers. Plamann (2002) and Steiner (1997) have similar findings for older unemployed. Steiner (2001) concludes that the results are in accordance with one of the main implications of job-search theory, i.e. unemployment durations increase when entitlement periods are extended. Using a longer and larger dataset from the GSOEP and pooling data from West Germany for 1984-96 with data from East Germany for 1992-96, Decressin (2001) re-analyzes the same institutional changes in the 1980s as Hunt (1995) .
5 As a major difference to Hunt (1995) , this study only assigns individuals to the treatment group who actually are eligible for unemployment benefits because the institutional effects only apply for this group. One would expect this to sharpen the estimated disincentive effects. However, as the main result, Decressin (2001) concludes that there is no systematic relation between the institutional changes in the 1980s and the exit rates from unemployment, thus implying that the length of entitlement periods has no effect on the duration of unemployment. In contrast to earlier studies and in line with the international evidence (Meyer, 2002) , Decressin (2001) finds a strong negative relation between the amount of unemployment benefits and the hazard rate from unemployment. Similar to Decressin (2001) , Schneider and Hujer (1997 ), using GSOEP data, and Weber (1999 ), 4. Only Plamann (2002 and Weber (1999) use earlier versions of the IAB employment subsample. Both studies do not explicitly address the problem that unemployment in an economic sense cannot be identified in this data set; see discussion in Section 3. 5. Decressin (2001) also analyzes reductions of benefits in 1994.
Unemployment Durations during the 1980s and 1990s
r 2009 The Authors Journal Compilation r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009 using the IAB employment subsample, do not find effects of the institutional changes in the 1980s on the duration of unemployment until a new job is found.
The conflicting evidence based on the GSOEP might be due to the following data problems. First, there is strong evidence for heaping effects in the survey, such that a disproportionately large number of unemployment spells is reported to end in December. This is due to the fact that the interview each year involves asking retrospectively for the monthly employment status during the last year. Then, this monthly employment calendar is put together on a year-by-year basis and unemployment spells ending early in a year seem to be under-reported in that year. Researchers often take account of this problem by adding a December dummy in their analysis (e.g. Hunt, 1995) , but it is not clear whether this is sufficient. Second, recent evidence shows a strong recollection error for the retrospective employment calendar in the GSOEP ( Jürges, 2005) . Third, the GSOEP involves a large number of missings regarding unemployment benefits. Fourth, unemployment in the GSOEP is measured as registered unemployment ('arbeitslos gemeldet'). Thus, it is not clear whether individuals are unemployed in an economic sense, i.e. actively searching for a job. This distinction becomes very important regarding incentives for early retirement by elderly workers. Finally, the sample size of the GSOEP is too small for a detailed competing risks model by age groups and year, a complaint raised also by Hunt (1995) .
Changes in benefit entitlement periods potentially affect other labor market outcomes in addition to prolonging the duration of unemployment (Meyer, 2002) . Two noteworthy aspects are the quality of the job match after having found a job and the incidence of unemployment (inflows). In a search model, an extension of the benefit entitlement period increases the reservation wage and reduces the search effort. The first effect should result in a better job match (e.g. higher wage), once employment is found. The reduction in search effort works in the opposite direction. In a recent study for Germany, Gangl (2002) finds positive effects of longer entitlement periods for unemployment benefits on the quality of subsequent jobs regarding the wage level and the stability of employment. Since the extension of benefit entitlements makes unemployment more attractive, the incidence of unemployment should increase among individuals who are eligible for the longer benefits (Meyer, 2002) . This second effect has not been analyzed explicitly for Germany and will be addressed in our empirical analysis.
The recent study by the OECD (2003a) emphasizes that changes in incentives induced by unemployment benefits take a while until they show their full impact. A major reason is that changes in incentives often involve an adjustment of lifestyle and a corresponding change in the inflows into unemployment. Thus, the full impact of institutional changes on the incidence of unemployment and the duration of unemployment can only be observed some years after the changes occurred. However, in a recent paper, Card et al. (2007) 6 analyze the effects of exhaustion of the benefit entitlement period on both exits from unemployment to employment and on exits from registered unemployment, based on Austrian administrative data. Similar in spirit to the results of our paper, all exits from registered unemployment show a much larger spike at exhaustion of the benefit entitlement period, compared with exits from registered unemployment to employment. The authors conclude that the spike in the former measure may overstate the disincentive effect of unemployment benefits.
DATA AND INSTITUTIONS
The empirical analysis uses the IAB Employment Subsample (IAB-Beschüaf-tigtenstichprobe 1975 -1997 , IABS). A basic description of this dataset can be found in Bender et al. (2000) . 7 To sharpen our understanding of the data-generating process, we decided not to rely on written information only. One of the authors visited several unemployment offices in different parts of West Germany to explore in more detail the reliability of the information recorded and how specific data problems can be explained. The data contain daily register data of about 500,000 individuals in West Germany on their employment spells and the spells during which they receive transfer payments from the labor offices. It is a representative sample of employment subject to social security taxation and, therefore, it is not representative with respect to other labor market states. Employment periods are based on the register records of the public pension funds that obtain from the companies the relevant information about employment spells subject to social security taxation. Periods of employment as lifetime civil servants (Beamte) or self-employment are not included in the data.
Periods of registered unemployment -or economically more meaningful concepts of unemployment (e.g. according to the International Laba Organization standard) -cannot be identified from the data. The German federal labor office has added instead periods of certain income transfer payments. The data record spells involving the following three types of transfer payments:
(1) unemployment benefits (UB) ('Arbeitslosengeld'); (2) unemployment assistance (UA) ('Arbeitslosenhilfe'); and (3) income maintenance during training (IMT) ('Unterhaltsgeld'). This is paid during participation in public sponsored training as a part of active labor market policy.
6. We did not know about this paper when we submitted the first version of our paper. 7. These data are also used by Plamann (2002) and Weber (1999) to analyze the duration of unemployment.
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r 2009 The Authors Journal Compilation r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009 Our discussion of institutions refers to the set-up between 1981 and 1997, which differs from the situation today. 8 The analysis in this paper is restricted to the years 1981-97 because the information about spells with transfer payments is likely to be incomplete before that time; see Bender et al. (2000) and the references therein.
The three types of transfer payments differ with respect to the income replacement ratio and as to whether they are means tested. UB as well as IMT are paid as certain percentage (between 60% and 67%) of past earnings and they are generally not means tested. UA involves a somewhat lower replacement ratio (between 53% and 58% in the period of consideration) and it is means tested.
9 Provided that individuals had sufficiently long employment spells before they become unemployed, they are eligible for UB for the maximum entitlement periods depicted in Table A .1. After the end of the maximum entitlement periods, they would become eligible for the lower UA only if their family had, at most, a negligible other source of income, i.e. UA is means tested. Until 1997, participation in training did not only provide a source of income through receipt of IMT, but it also renewed the entitlement for UB -just as if the unemployed individual had been working.
Unfortunately, the data only involve spell information on the fact whether transfer payments were received but do not provide information on the level of these payments nor on the entitlement length. Evidence reported in Franz (2006, Table 7 .10) suggests that the actual replacement ratios are typically lower than the nominal ratios mentioned above. This is mostly due to temporary (6-12 weeks) or permanent sanctions ('Sperrzeiten'), which are mainly applied for two reasons. First, when an unemployed worker quits voluntarily, he becomes eligible for UB only after a period of time. Second, when an unemployed worker rejects an acceptable job offer, he is punished by losing UB for a while. The IABS reports these periods of no UB receipt as a late start or as interruption in the spells of transfer payments. Wilke (2004) provides a descriptive analysis of sanctions in the IAB-employment subsample.
In order to reduce the labor supply and 'free jobs for young workers', government policy allowed receipt of UB as an intermediate step between employment and early retirement. While being on UB, social security taxes were still paid for unemployed individuals and they were still accumulating claims on social security payments after retirement. In addition, the discount on social security payments after early retirement, i.e. before the official 8. Also during the time period under consideration, a number of changes were enacted in addition to the extension of the benefit entitlement periods. For instance, the income replacement ratios for UB and UA were reduced in the case of unemployed individuals without children and increased in the case of unemployed individuals with children; see Hunt (1995) . The income replacement ratio for IMT was above the ratio for UB at the beginning. It was reduced a number of times so that, for most of the time period under consideration, it was equal to the ratio for UB. 9. See Decressin (2001) for a detailed analysis of the changes in the replacement ratios.
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344 retirement age at 65 years, was actuarially biased in favor of early retirement (see Table A1 in Berkel and Börsch-Supan, 2003) . Thus, during the mid-1980s receipt of UB was becoming the stepping stone towards early retirement for workers at an age above 55 years (see Koller et al., 2003 , for a recent account of this).
The data provide no information on spells when an individual is registered as unemployed and is not entitled to transfer payments from the labor offices as well as whether she receives welfare payments ('Sozialhilfe'). This is particularly relevant for an analysis of long-term unemployment, which, in cases without transfer payments in the data, cannot be reasonably distinguished from having left the labor force.
PROXIES FOR UNEMPLOYMENT
Since the data do not allow for an exact economically meaningful assessment as to whether an individual is unemployed or out of the labor force, we use the two variables non-employment and unemployment between jobs as benchmarks to analyze the changes in the duration of unemployment which are operationalized as follows:
(1) Non-employment (NE): all periods of NE after an employment period which contain at least one period with UB, UA, or IMT transfer payments by the German federal labor office. 10 The NE period is considered as censored if the last record involves a transfer payment that is not followed by an employment spell.
11 In this case, we do not know whether the individual is still unemployed, out of the labor force, or even selfemployed after the end of the last observed transfer payment spell. The spell is not censored if we observe later a successful exit to employment. With this definition of unemployment we include the periods of NE (out of the labor force, social benefits) that are not explicitly recorded in the data. From 1980 to 1997, a total number of 371.317 NE periods are observed in the IABS.
(2) Unemployment between jobs (UBJ): all episodes between two employment spells during which an individual continuously receives UB, UA, or IMT payments. Interruptions of these payments can occur for up to four weeks -in the case of cut-off times, six weeks. With this definition, it is ensured that the individuals are continuously registered as unemployed. Note that this sample does not include many registered 10. Spells where the employment spell in the respective year defining the inflow sample into non-employment ends without a beginning spell with transfer payment are not considered here because these spells most likely represent spells out of the labor force. Such spells are not affected by the reforms of unemployment compensation. 11. A non-employment spell is treated as right censored at the end of the last observed transfer spell if it is not fully observed, i.e. if we do not observe a transition to employment before the end of the observation period. These two definitions provide benchmarks on the length of unemployment, taking account of the fact that not all unemployed are successful in finding a new job during the period of observation (therefore the UBJ definition cannot be used alone) and of the fact that unemployed individuals may leave the labor force. We assume that the distribution of actual unemployment (AU) in an economically meaningful concept lies between the length of UBJs and the length of NE. In the case when people eventually leave the labor force, NE in a strict sense is only known to be right censored at the end of the observation period. We assume that censoring times are independent. In order to obtain a tighter bound for actual unemployment in this case, the NE definition assumes that actual unemployment ends at some unknown point of time after the exhaustion of transfer payment and it is quite likely that the end of actual unemployment lies before the end of the observation period. Therefore, in this case, the only information used in the NE definition is that unemployment is right censored at the end of transfer payments. Of course, NE, being an upper bound, accounts for the possibility that individuals might have left the labor force before the end of the transfer payments, for example because they are not interested in a new job any more, and they just keep receiving the transfer payments until the labor offices are able to penalize this behavior. 12 The NE definition also contains time gaps for individuals who may have left the labor force for some period.
13 It is also important to mention that we only include spells with at least one day of receipt of unemployment compensation, as unemployment without any receipt of unemployment compensation can hardly be analyzed with present data and it was not affected by the reforms under consideration. In contrast, the UBJ definition excludes cases where a job is found some time after the end of the entitlement to transfer payments as these unobserved periods may correspond to a transition to out of the labor force. This allows us to focus on the link between benefit entitlement periods and the observed distribution of finding a job. A similar approach is also used by Card et al. (2007) . In an earlier discussion paper version of this paper (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2004 , Section 5), we provide a theoretical model that analyzes the link between the length of unemployment, NE and UBJ in a competing risk model, which involves exits from unemployment to both employment and to out of the labor force.
12. See Wilke (2004) for an analysis of sanctions for unemployed. This study suggests that sanctions, to a large extent, seem ineffective due to a high withdrawal rate. 13. Using a more informative data source which is not available to researchers outside of the BA, Stefan Bender kindly provided us with information about the status of individuals with unobserved periods before they start a new employment spell. He found that almost 80% of these periods correspond to other transfer payments.
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We cannot base our analysis on the concept of 'registered unemployment', which is commonly often used in the public debate on unemployment, since there is not sufficient information in the data to identify this. Analogous to the argument above, it is reasonable to assume that the distribution of the length of registered unemployment spells lies between the length of UBJs and the length of NE (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance). The results of our empirical analysis therefore apply just as well to registered unemployment.
14 However, in an economic sense, registered unemployment differs from our notion of actual unemployment.
EVIDENCE ON UNEMPLOYMENT DURATIONS
This section presents the main descriptive empirical findings of the paper. We investigate the durations of NE and UBJs for different age groups 15 and different years. First, we present some raw evidence based on histograms and median lengths for the observed, possibly censored durations, as well as trends over time in the incidence of unemployment. Next, we provide Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival functions taking account of censoring in the observed durations. Then, we interpret our findings. Our analysis tries to capture the long-term effects of the reform and, therefore, it is not restricted to the immediate post-reform years (see OECD, 2003a , and the discussion at the end of Section 2).
Raw evidence
For the unemployment spells starting at the begin of the considered period (1981) and at the end of the available data (1994), the histograms in Figure  A .1 present the empirical distributions over the first three years (% 1.095 calender days). The upper panel shows the NE spells and the lower panel the UBJ spells. The censored observations are included in the distribution of NE durations. It is important to note that there are small mass points at 12 months (1981 and 1994) and 32 months (1994) in the distribution of NE spells. These mass points are directly related to the maximum UB entitlement periods: a considerable number of NE spells are censored at the end of the UB entitlement period. Interestingly, mass points at these durations are not observed for UBJ spells. This suggests that job searchers usually do not wait until the exhaustion of their UB entitlement period before they accept a new job. Figure A. 2 presents the median unemployment duration for the age groups of duration for those greater than 53 years, 16 the unemployed almost doubled over this period, whereas it remained basically constant for those aged less than 42 years. For the other age groups, the median NE duration remained constant during the 1980s and increased after the German reunification in the 1990s. This is most likely due to macroeconomic changes. Considering the median UBJ durations, one observes the same variation due to the business cycle but, at the same time, the older unemployed (greater than 53 years) leave unemployment faster than all other age groups. This property does not change over time and is therefore not affected by the reforms under consideration. Note that figures for the years after 1995 are not reported due to the censoring of the data at the end of 1997. Table A .2 reports the observed number (incidence) of unemployment spells for the different age groups. Most noticeable is the sharp increase of the NE spells for the age group greater than 53 years, i.e. the inflows into NE spells, but not into UBJ; spells increased strongly over time. This finding corresponds to our evidence on transitions from employment to unemployment in Section 6.1.
Kaplan-Meier estimates
This section presents estimates of survival functions, which report the probability of remaining in NE and in UBJ, respectively, after a given duration. The Kaplan-Meier estimator takes account of the inherent censoring for NE durations. An upward movement (increase) of the survival functions means that the probability of leaving unemployment has decreased.
17
The following figures present selected representative survival function estimates for the 1980s and 1990s (until 1995) for the age groups considered.
18 Figure A .3 (left, upper panel) shows that the NE survival function did not change much for those aged less than 42. The estimated survival curves are higher for bad years (1981, 1994 : bad in the sense of the labor market conditions) and lower for good years (1985, 1990) . For the age groups of 42-43 and 44-48, we observe similar changes apart from that survival functions increase in the labor market slowdown of the mid-1990s ( Figure A.3 , left, middle and bottom). For the age group of 49-53, the increase 16. The temporary decline in 1985 can be rationalized by the anticipation of the introduction of a more generous early retirement policy in 1986. Since 1986, there exists the possibility for older unemployed (currently aged 59 or above) to receive unemployment benefitsirrespective of their entitlement based on their employment history -if they commit not to search for a new job. 17. A detailed Kaplan-Meier unemployment survival analysis of the West German 26-41 aged workforce can be found in Wilke (2005) . 18. Due to the large sample sizes, the corresponding confidence bands are narrow. We did not add them because this would affect the readability of the graphs, while the gain in information would be rather limited for our following reasonings.
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in the mid-1990s is sharper ( Figure A .4, left, upper panel) . Considering the age group greater than 53, it is apparent that the NE survival functions increased continuously over the 15 years under consideration and they did so even in the boom year after the reunification ( Figure A.4, left, bottom) . Interestingly, at the same time, the UBJ survival curves of the older age group (greater than 53 years) remained almost constant(!) ( Figure A .4, right, bottom). We observe similar patterns for the other age groups and the survival curves in the mid-1990s increased a bit for all groups, including even the younger unemployed. It is not evident from these results that the increase is due to the reform between 1985 and 1987. It seems to be caused by a structural change due to the unfavorable macroeconomic environment. Since the increase of the UBJ survival functions is slightly greater for those aged 42-53 than for the young unemployed, it might be the case that the reform shows an effect in a weak macroeconomic situation only. Surprisingly, we do not observe this for those aged greater than 53. Our discussion of the differential shifts in the estimated survival function is confirmed by the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimatesD t;t 0 ¼Ŝ t ÀŜ t 0 À ðŜ
Þ evaluated at the observable durations, where S 0 is the survival function of the control age group less than 42 and calendar years t4t 0 . DiD estimates for the UBJ survival functions are presented in Figure A .5. Controlling for common time effects, they contrast the before-after reform changes in the estimated survival functions for the older age group, with the corresponding changes for the control group of younger workers less than 42 not affected by the reforms. While the DiD estimates for NE (the NE results are clear from Figures A.3 and A.4 and are not reported here; they are available upon request) show a strong upward movement of the NE survival functions for the older age group, we do not observe such evidence for UBJ (if any, the positive effects we see are considerably smaller for UBJ).
Figure A.6 shows that the survival curves vary sharply over the sector of last employment before entering unemployment. For the manufacturing sectors, 19 the survival curves for the age group greater than 53 increased up to more than 0.9 after three years (Figure A.6, left, upper panel) , while this probability is only about 0.6 for the other sectors 20 (Figure A.6, left, bottom) . The sharp increase of the survival functions, in particular in the manufacturing sector, is probably directly related to the massive early retirement programs which were conducted at this time. Considering the survival functions of those in UBJ ( Figure A.6, right) , the survival curves remained almost constant over time, with some increase in the manufacturing sector in the mid-1990s.
Considering the empirical survival functions for the age group greater than 53 years in Figure A entitlements are shifted to the right after the reform. This shift is particularly obvious for the manufacturing sectors, 21 where the empirical survival function is shifted about 20 months to the right. The jumps for NE (being absent for UBJ) reflect that many observed spells end at the maximum entitlement periods and are thus due to the administrative rules. It follows that many older non-employed then drop out of the labor force or they are not eligible for further UB. Figure A.4 (right, bottom) shows that most of them did not re-enter into regular employment.
Summary
Our findings can be summarized as follows. There is no evidence for the reforms increasing UBJ durations to a sizeable extent. Instead, the reforms result in longer NE spells, which are associated with higher exits out of the labor force for the elderly, most likely related to the strong increase in early retirement. In fact, it might be that the possibility of early retirement caused a reduction in unemployment duration in an economic sense, even though the duration of benefit recipience increased. This argument is rationalized by the stylized model developed in an earlier discussion paper version of this paper (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2004, Section 5) . Although this interpretation is plausible, we cannot interpret changes in the UBJ distribution in a causal way without imposing further assumptions. Moreover, it might be that many unemployed with UBJ duration did not have extended entitlement lengths as their previous employment periods are too short. For this reason, the invariance of the UBJ distribution has to be considered as a stylized fact.
We can postulate three further implications of our interpretation of the results, which follow our observation that no sizeable changes of the UBJ distribution took place. First, the incidence of inflows into UBJ should not increase, while, second, the incidence of inflows into NE should increase strongly. Third, the quality of jobs found after a UBJ spell should not have increased. These issues are investigated further in the next section.
EMPLOYMENT BEFORE AND AFTER UNEMPLOYMENT
This section adds evidence to the two further potential effects of an extension of benefit entitlement periods as discussed above, namely, on the incidence of unemployment and the quality of the post-unemployment jobs. Also, one might be concerned that our descriptive findings in Section 5 are affected by selection or composition effects. For instance, the group of older unemployed who end up finding a job might have become more selective in response to the reforms. The latter should show up in a higher quality of employment 21. During the period 1985-87 the maximum length of entitlements was increased step by step from 12 to 32 months. This pattern is clearly visible in Figure A .7 (left).
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before and after unemployment, for example in higher employment stability or in higher wages. Furthermore, one might expect that the quality of employment after unemployment increases because longer entitlement periods reduce search costs. To gauge the validity of our interpretation of the descriptive findings in Section 5, this section provides complementary descriptive evidence on the changes in employment before and after unemployment.
Transitions from employment to unemployment
Older workers in West Germany enjoyed substantial employment protection in the period under investigation, which is codified in the German law for dismissal protection. In practice, it is very difficult to lay-off older employees with long elapsed employment duration. 22 The risk of unemployment for this group of individuals should therefore be quite low. It is also important to mention that since 1986 there exists the possibility for older unemployed (currently aged 59 or above) to receive UB -irrespective of their entitlement based on their employment history -if they commit not to search for a new job. Older unemployed therefore have the option to receive UB until they are entitled to transfers from the pensions system and during this period they are not counted as unemployed in the official statistics. Figure A .8 presents the exit rates from employment to unemployment by age for 40-62-year-old employees based on the two definitions of unemployment in selected years with rather different macroeconomic conditions. 23 It becomes apparent that the risk of UBJ is almost independent of the age of the unemployed and of the year, whereas the risk of NE varies sharply. First, the risk of NE shows a peak between age 55 and 59. In 1981, the peak is only evident for age 59. In 1985 and 1990 the size of the peak declines but the dispersion increases and it shifts to the left. The shift to the left and the increased dispersion are due to the extension of the unemployment insurance payment. This is because even workers who lose their job at age 55 after the reform are able to reach the critical age limit 59 without interruption of UB transfers. In 1995, the size of the peak increases sharply. This is a likely effect of the severe recession in 1993/94. Moreover, the employees aged 55-60 exhibit uniformly higher risks of NE. The risk of NE is particularly high in the manufacturing sector and, even in the public sector, the risk of NE increases in the 1990s (see Figure A.9) . In Table A .3, we calculate the length of previous employment for employees who enter NE or UBJ. It is evident that, in particular, older employees with exits to NE exhibit very long previous 22. § 1 of the KSchG 'Law on employment protection' prohibits dismissals that are 'socially not justified'. This gives a higher degree of protection for older workers with long elapsed employment duration. employment spells. Over time, the length of previous employment increases and again the increase is strongest for the older age group. In manufacturing, this occurs for all groups in the age range 44 and above, while in the public sector we see this only for the group greater than 53. At the same time, we do not observe this for employees entering UBJ. Moreover, it is important to mention that the median length of pre-unemployment employment is between 10 and 12 months in the UBJ sample. This suggests that many of the unemployed with successful exit to employment do not have long unemployment benefit entitlement periods. This provides some evidence for why we should expect only moderate reform effects for the total group of older unemployed still looking for jobs. The different results for the two definitions of unemployment suggest that under bad economic circumstances UB are used specifically as an integral part in early retirement packages. Due to the reform of the maximum entitlement period, the peak of the NE risk shifted to the left, i.e. the early retirement is offered to the employees several years earlier.
Employment stability and wages after unemployment
Employment after unemployment could be affected by the policy change and by changes in the composition of UBJ transitions over time. This can be assessed by analyzing the length of the following employment spells (employment stability) and the changes in earnings after unemployment compared with before unemployment. Also, search theory (assuming exogenous search effort) would suggest that the match quality of employment after unemployment increases, resulting, for instance, in higher employment stability or in a higher wage, when longer entitlement periods for UB reduce search costs. Figure A .10 reports the median 24 of the length of employment spells after UBJ. The evidence does not show improvement for the older age group over time compared with the younger unemployed; see also the corresponding evidence in Figure A .11 for the estimated survival functions. It is also apparent that the median is highest for 1988 because employment stability was highest during the reunification boom, with low unemployment rates during the time period 1990-92. Now, we turn to the wage as another indicator for the quality of the subsequent match. Let us denote w p as the wage of the unemployed in previous employment and denote w f as the wage in future employment. In the following, let us consider the transition from the position of w p in the wage distribution (F) in the year when the unemployment spell begins (t1) to the position of w f in F in the year when the unemployment spell ends (t2). Let us denote DF t1 5 F t2 (w f ) À F t1 (w p ) as the change in the position in the wage distribution. DF t has an intuitive meaning: it is negative ( positive) if the 24. The median is chosen because many long employment spells are censored at the data end of 1997. This affects, in particular, the average values in the 1990s.
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future wage is in a lower (higher) position in the population wage distribution than the previous wage. An extension of the maximum entitlements period should allow the unemployed to spend more time waiting for the same job offer compared with an individual without extended entitlements. This should increase the expected DF t for the treated individuals and therefore result in a shift of the distribution of DF t to the right. Table A .4 presents the summary statistics for DF t for the full-time employees in the different age groups. It is evident that the distributions for the age groups are almost time invariant. 25 The increase of the maximum entitlement period is not associated with a shift of the distributions for the treated individuals to the right. Most likely, the changes in the distributions are mainly due to the business cycle. Surprisingly, between 50% and 60% of the considered group of unemployed improve their position in the wage distribution after unemployment compared with before.
26 Summarizing, at a descriptive level, there is no evidence among older unemployed for a higher quality of job after unemployment regarding employment stability or higher wages. A possible explanation for this is that the quality of search has not changed and, at the same time, we do not find evidence that the group of older workers with UBJ transitions has become a more positive selection over time. We take this as complementary evidence supporting our interpretation of the descriptive findings in Section 5. Our evidence differs from Gangl (2002) but is consistent with the recent findings of van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) .
INTERPRETATION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides a descriptive analysis of the duration of NE and UBJ in West Germany. We investigate the effects of the extensions in the maximum entitlement period for UB for older workers during the mid-1980s. To investigate further our interpretation of the main empirical results and to analyze whether selection or composition effects are important, our empirical analysis provides complementary descriptive evidence on employment before and after unemployment.
Our main empirical result is that the duration of NE for older unemployed increased sharply after the reform under consideration, whereas the duration of UBJ did not change. This is because UB were more frequently used as an integral part of early retirement packages and earlier retirement took place due to the extended entitlement lengths. With the reform, private firms -25. Non-parametric density estimates of the distributions are also time invariant over 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1994. 26 . We also performed a mean regression analysis with wage after unemployment as dependent and maximum entitlement lengths, among many other variables, as regressors. Results also do not point to systematic effects of the entitlement lengths on wages. They are available upon request from the authors.
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r 2009 The Authors Journal Compilation r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2009 and also the public sector -obtained a convenient instrument to disband earlier older employees with the help of social compensation plans. Since the older employees approved of such generous retirement packages, they did not insist on their dismissal protection. This potential win-win situation at the expense of the unemployment insurance is even observed in the public sector. The increase in the usage of early retirement is also strongly suggested both by the increase in the inflows of older workers into NE, especially in the economic recession after the reform, compared with the fact that inflows of older workers into UBJ did not increase after the reform. Our results imply that it is indispensable to distinguish between the flows out of the labor force and the flows back into employment among the older (greater than 53 years) unemployed, a point already emphasized by Hunt (1995) . Our analysis would therefore benefit from more comprehensive data that contains information about inflows to retirement. Our descriptive analysis is also not able to account for changes due to the business cycle or for indirect effects due to other reforms during the observation period. The striking aspect of our descriptive results is that the distribution of UBJ durations for older workers evidently did not shift to the right. Clearly, our descriptive evidence on UBJ durations is based on an endogenous outcome conditioning on one exit state in a competing risk model, involving exits from unemployment to both employment and to out of the labor force. Ceteris paribus (no change in the transition to out of the labor force via early retirement), one would expect a movement of the UBJ distribution to the right in response to an increase in benefit entitlement periods. Search theory would predict such a movement. By definition, longer entitlement periods also imply a truncation of UBJ after a longer duration of unemployment, which would also result in a movement to the right. Thus, if anything, the endogenous nature of the UBJ definition should bias the results against our findings.
Our findings are consistent with simulations based on a simple competing risks model with unobserved heterogeneity as spelled out in an earlier discussion paper version of this paper (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2004, Section 5) . The model involves exits from unemployment to both employment and out of the labor force and it allows us to analyze the link between the length of unemployment, NE and UBJ. Based on the model, we simulate a policy reform that both decreases the transition rate from unemployment to employment and increases the transition rate from unemployment to out of the labor force. As a result of such a reform, the UBJ may even move to the left because of the much more frequent moves out of the labor force.
Based on the considerations above, we think that our interpretation of the results is likely to be correct. There are two additional plausible explanations for our findings which may complement our interpretation. First, many older unemployed with exits to employment do not have long entitlement lengths for UB. Second, a considerable share of older unemployed with extended entitlement periods for UB did not change job search behavior after the reform. We cannot assess these explanations based on our analysis.
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Admittedly, more research is necessary on the determinants of UBJ and NE and the differences between the two. This is confirmed in a recent paper by Card et al. (2007) , who analyze the effects of exhaustion of the benefit entitlement period on both exits from unemployment to employment and on exits from registered unemployment for Austria. Similar in spirit to the results of our paper, the latter show a much larger spike at exhaustion of the benefit entitlement period for all exits from registered unemployment compared with the exits to employment. Our results show that the distribution of unemployment durations for the group of unemployed with successful exit to employment before and after the reform was evidently not affected by the reform considered here. Our results also suggest that the varying macroeconomic environment may affect the job search behavior for the considered age groups in a different manner. Finally, extended benefit entitlements for older unemployed are not found to increase the job match quality in terms of employment stability or earnings. Put differently, this suggests that, among the older unemployed, the selection of those unemployed who found a new job did not change in response to the reform. More research using a more structural approach at the cost of stronger identifying assumptions will be useful to assess further the robustness of our findings.
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